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Social coordination and affordance perception always take part in concrete situations
in real life. Nonetheless, the different fields of ecological psychology studying these
phenomena do not seem to make this situated nature an object of study. To integrate
both fields and extend the reach of the ecological approach, we introduce the
Skilled Intentionality Framework that situates both social coordination and affordance
perception within the human form of life and its rich landscape of affordances. We
argue that in the human form of life the social and the material are intertwined and best
understood as sociomateriality. Taking the form of life as our starting point foregrounds
sociomateriality in each perspective we take on engaging with affordances. Using
ethnographical examples we show how sociomateriality shows up from three different
perspectives we take on affordances in a real-life situation. One perspective shows
us a landscape of affordances that the sociomaterial environment offers. Zooming
in on this landscape to the perspective of a local observer, we can focus on an
individual coordinating with affordances offered by things and other people situated in
this landscape. Finally, viewed from within this unfolding activity, we arrive at the person’s
lived perspective: a field of relevant affordances solicits activity. The Skilled Intentionality
Framework offers a way of integrating social coordination and affordance theory by
drawing attention to these complementary perspectives. We end by showing a real-
life example from the practice of architecture that suggests how this situated view that
foregrounds sociomateriality can extend the scope of ecological psychology to forms of
so-called “higher” cognition.
Keywords: affordances, social coordination, ecological psychology, enaction, materiality, sociomateriality, Skilled
Intentionality Framework, “higher” cognition
“. . . I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.” – Wittgenstein (1969, §97)
INTRODUCTION
In order to understand human social coordination in a Gibsonian framework it is important to
understand in what sense affordances – possibilities for action provided to us by the environment
(Gibson, 1979) – are always already situated in the sociomaterial practices that make up our human
form of life; i.e., in what sense it is an affordance-in-sociomaterial-practice. Our approach is to
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combine such theoretical work on affordances with concrete real-
life situations of social interaction as described in ethnography.
As such this paper is targeted to anyone with an interest in
affordances and skilled action, including skilled social action
as we encounter that for example in ecological psychology,
philosophy and various domains within the social sciences.
Affordances, as “what [the environment] offers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127),
allow us to foreground sociomateriality because they do not occur
in isolation. Rather, affordances are aspects of the ecological niche
of a kind of animal. They thus always figure in a “setting of
environmental features” (Gibson, 1979, p. 129), or of multiple
affordances (p. 128).
Affordances are thus always situated. Looking around one will
notice things and people offering multiple possibilities for action.
Siting in the train for example, I can notice the possibility to
drink from a bottle of water, talk to a fellow traveler or return
to writing this paragraph. All these affordances belong to a wider
socio-cultural context (Hodges and Baron, 1992; Costall, 1995;
Ingold, 2000; Heft, 2001; Rietveld, 2008a). For example, I am
seated in a “silence area,” so talking is not really an option and
the bottle of water is not mine, but belongs to my neighbor, so
I better not drink from it. Doing not much else than writing
in this silence area, I am thus showing a responsiveness to a
whole socially significant situation – to the kind of place in
which I am situated, to a “behavior setting” (Heft, 2007, 2011).
Moreover by typing away in appropriate silence, I contribute
to maintaining this behavior setting as a “silence area” indeed.
This way of responding and contributing to the maintenance of a
behavior setting is a form of social coordination, albeit different
from what is typically studied in ecological psychology, because
it acknowledges social aspects even in situations where there is
no direct interacting with other individuals (but see Barker, 1968;
Heft, 2001).
More orthodox forms of social coordination are also found in
our example and these are situated as well. In the behavior setting
that is the train’s silence area, I am actually continuously adjusting
my feet and leg placement to accommodate the person opposite
me. I pretend not to be annoyed when someone’s phone rings,
and exchange a brief glance of understanding with someone else
equally annoyed. Adapting continuously to the people around
me, I let the situation constrain my behavior, and by doing so
(still typing in appropriate silence) I again do my part to maintain
it. In fact, for any person in this silence area, being responsive
to the behavior setting includes both being responsive to the
opportunities for action, the affordances, offered by the material
environment and to the opportunities for social engagement
offered by other people. As we will show, there is no clear
separation of the two because in acting skillfully one is attuned
to the situation as a whole.
Despite the fact that in such real-life situations affordances and
social coordination are situationally intertwined, the contextually
situated nature of both is easily overlooked. An affordance for
e.g., stair climbing (Warren, 1984) would be responded to very
differently if one hopes to get up the old squeaking stairs without
waking anyone, and the way one approaches and stops for a red
light in a car (Fajen, 2007) changes if one is driving with one’s
elderly mother-in-law or with a newborn baby in the backseat
(see Hodges, 2007). Similarly, judging whether something can be
carried together (Richardson et al., 2007) might change as soon as
such judgment is required in a different context – say for carrying
a coffin at a funeral. The dynamics of the coordinating people that
actually carry a coffin would no doubt change as well. In other
words, to understand how we respond to affordances offered both
by material aspects of the environment and by other people, it is
crucial that we understand the practical situation in which such
behavior occurs.
Within ecological psychology there is currently a divide
between the field of research that focuses on engagement with the
affordances offered by the material environment and the field that
focuses on social coordination. Moreover, as paradigmatic cases
and dedicated methods are developing largely independently in
both areas of ecological psychology, they risk focusing on a
limited set of phenomena and growing apart further. The above
examples, however, indicate that neither work that focuses on
affordances in isolation nor on social coordination on its own,
can account for the full breadth of skilled involvement of humans
in the context of their ecological niche.
In fact, both fields are already focusing mostly on cases
of direct “online” behavior (responding either on a current
affordance or to another person), but neither foregrounds the
larger situational context in which these dynamics unfold.
Because of that, ecological psychology has yet to move into
the domain labeled “oﬄine” or “higher” cognition, such as
dealing with non-existent things (i.e., “representation hungry”
problems – see Clark and Toribio, 1994; see also Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014; Rietveld and Brouwers, 2016; Van Dijk and
Withagen, 2016). To get the most out of ecological theory and
extend ecological psychology beyond its current scope, we believe
we need a framework that integrates both fields in a fundamental
way. Doing so, we will claim, requires an understanding of
individuals as coordinating with and situated in multiple nested
scales of sociomaterial dynamics. We need to understand the
human eco-niche as being sociomaterial through and through.
Having such an integrative account, we believe, will not only
bring the two parts of ecological theory closer together, but will
also allow ecological theory as a whole to broaden its scope to
include the wide variety of human practices.
To provide such an integrative account and broaden
the scope of ecological psychology we will introduce the
Skilled Intentionality Framework (SIF). Skilled Intentionality
is coordinating with multiple affordances simultaneously. Our
main point will be to show that the SIF integrates social
coordination and affordances in a fundamental way because it
incorporates the notion of sociomateriality. We will do so by
first explaining the concept of sociomateriality as found in the
field of ethnography in Section “Sociomaterial Entanglement.”
After this preliminary, we will introduce three complementary
perspectives on the human practices and the affordances they
imply. In Section “Practices and the Landscape of Affordances”
(i) a zoomed out perspective on our human practices as a
whole will be provided in which the materiality and standing
practices can be identified that constrain an individual’s activities.
Complementing this perspective the section goes on to discuss
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(ii) a zoomed in perspective of a local observer looking at people
acting in their environment. This second perspective highlights
how individuals coordinating together continuously restructure
sociomateriality. In Section “Skilled Intentionality” (iii) a third
perspective is added: the lived perspective of a skilled individual
being responsive to its surroundings.
Each of these perspectives on the human form of life
brings an aspect of human involvement into view. On its
own, however, any one perspective also loses sight of other
aspects of situated coordination, which is the reason why we
believe they are best treated as complementary perspectives. The
metaphor of zooming in and out enables us to see how the SIF
combines these perspectives to arrive at a rich framework for
understanding a wide range of human involvement in ecological
terms. Using an ethnographical example of the sociomaterial
engagement of architects in practice, we will end Section “Skilled
Intentionality” by illustrating how integrating social coordination
with affordance-theory in a fundamental way, can open up
ecological theory to dealing with “hard cases” of the “whole realm
of social significance” as Gibson (1979, p. 128, our italics) called
it. In the case of architecture this includes real life situations of
dealing with non-existent things, such as a vision, drawing or
model for a future building.
SOCIOMATERIAL ENTANGLEMENT
The neighbor’s bottle of water encountered while riding the train
offered the opportunity to drink from, even though it would have
been highly inappropriate to do so. It offered this affordance
rather than, say, throwing it out of the window. The affordance of
drinking from a bottle has, as Costall (1997) called a “canonical”
character. Crucially, this canonical character comes from the
bottle figuring in a large “constellation” of practices as Costall
(2012, p. 91) calls it, shared among many individuals. In this way
canonical affordances:
“characterize the normative character of the meaning of things.
A chair, for example, is for sitting on, even though it may be used
in many other ways, e.g., as firewood or for standing upon. The
meaning of a chair is defined by its name, sustained and revealed
within certain practices, and realized in its very construction.”
(Costall, 1997, p. 97)
What Costall’s notion of canonical affordances stresses is the
fact that such affordances are situated not just in the “current”
behavior setting, but also in a more encompassing, shared and
historically developed constellation – such affordances exist as
they persist in shared and social practices (see also Ingold, 2000,
pp. 167–168). They exist as many individuals act on them in
more or less appropriate ways, in the totality of practices that,
together with other affordances, sustain them. For example,
citing Dreyfus (1988), Costall points out that a hammer will
only be perceived as such against the background of dealing
with nails, walls and, say, pictures that afford hanging; i.e.,
against, what Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 97) called, a “totality
of equipment.” As such, canonical affordances are part of what
we might call a wider “standing practice”; they are relatively
persistent material aspects of the practices in our shared socio-
cultural environment, depending on an entire community of
people, yet on no individual in particular.
Sociomateriality in Practice
In the view that we are developing in this paper, relevant aspects
of the environment and of the organism can only be understood
in a concrete situation within a constellation of practices.
Acknowledging these practices allows us to place socio-cultural
aspects of our coordination center stage. However, material
aspects of the environment equally partake in the constellation
of practices. To see this, the taken for granted conception
of materiality as “pre-formed substances” (Orlikowski, 2007,
p. 1438) needs to be reconsidered.
Consider for instance research in the social sciences concerned
with workplace practices. This research emphasizes how social
practices are “inherently bound-up with materiality” such as
places, material artifacts, bodies, and, infrastructures (Orlikowski,
2007, p. 1436). Zooming in on concrete situations by means
of ethnography, the material and the social turn out to
be intertwined in ways that lead researchers undertaking
ethnographic studies to speak of “sociomaterial practices” (Mol,
2002; Suchman, 2007). Ethnographer Annemarie Mol illustrates
this intertwinement well in discussing her ethnographic work in
medical practice:
“[T]he practice of diagnosing and treating diseases inevitably
requires cooperation. . . . In the consulting room something is
done. . . .[T]wo people are required. A doctor and a patient. . . .
The doctor must ask questions and the patient be willing and able
to attend to answer them. And in addition to these two people
there are other elements that play a more or less important role.
The desk, the chairs, the general practitioner, the letter: they all
participate in the events . . . As does [the patient’s] dog, without
whom she might not have even tried to walk more than the fifty
meters after which her left leg starts to hurt.” (Mol, 2002, pp.
22–23).
This example shows that the particular details (form the desk
and the chairs to the patient’s dog) of the situations in which
we act, matter a lot, which is why the constellation of practices
shows up as sociomaterial in nature. It is only within the context
of this situation that one of the people is primarily a “patient”
(rather than say a grandmother or a love interest) and that the
piece of paper shows up as an important “letter” from the general
practitioner rather than as offering the opportunity to fold it
into an airplane. More generally, ethnographic research like this
shows that:
“all practices are always and everywhere sociomaterial, and . . .
this sociomateriality is constitutive, shaping the contours and
possibilities of everyday organizing.” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1444)
The “possibilities of everyday organizing,” the affordances
encountered in daily life in the human ecological niche, form
within our practices and these affordances are therefore always
and everywhere sociomaterial. For example, we saw already that
hammers are not just heavy things – their canonical character
emphasized that they afford hammering relative to a socio-
cultural practice. Moreover now we can see how this in turn
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affects its materiality: hammers are not just heavy, hammers
are heavy enough, they have the appropriate weight to drive
in a nail – a hammer’s materiality is sociomateriality (see also
Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 98). In the context of our practices,
the aspect of the sociomaterial environment also known as a
“hammer” affords driving in nails. To be skillful in dealing
with a hammer then, is to know your way about a particular
aspect of the human form of life (see Wittgenstein, 1953, §123;
see also Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Van Dijk and Withagen,
2014).1
Constitutive Entanglement
According to the social scientists quoted above, possibilities for
everyday action are sociomaterial in a constitutive way, that is:
“A position of constitutive entanglement does not privilege either
humans or technology (in one-way interactions), nor does it
link them through a form of mutual reciprocation (in two-way
interactions). Instead, the social and the material are considered to
be inextricably related — there is no social that is not also material,
and no material that is not also social.” (Orlikowski, 2007, p. 1437)
This is of fundamental importance and requires some
unpacking. The notion of a constitutive entanglement is
characterized by two features. First, its various aspects are
interdependent and second, it emphasizes that none of the
aspects has priority (is “privileged”) over another (see also Ter
Hark, 1990; Schatzki, 1996; Mol, 2002, p. 133; Orlikowski, 2007;
Ingold, 2011; Van Dijk, 2016; Van Dijk and Withagen, 2016).
The ethnographic examples above that stress how the social
implies materiality and materiality implies the social offer a
case in point. But let us look at both features more closely by
considering the relations between practices, affordances, activities
and sociomateriality.
The relation between a practice and the affordances implied
by it can be understood constitutionally. It is an example of a
constitutive relation because (i) the practice and the affordances
that take shape within it are interdependent: any affordance will
imply a practice for realizing it and any practice will imply a
landscape of available affordances.2 Furthermore (ii) practices
and affordances do not admit of a prioritization. As we saw above,
the affordance to use a hammer is available within the context
of our hammering practices and conversely, the hammering
1There is in important normative aspect to this kind of skilled engagement
in a form of life or socio-cultural practice. Such “situated normativity” can be
seen as distinguishing between better and worse (e.g., adequate and inadequate,
appropriate and inappropriate, or correct and incorrect) in the context of a
concrete situation (Rietveld, 2008a). We have analyzed this kind of situated
normativity in earlier work, both for unreflective skilled action (Rietveld, 2008a,
2010) and for more reflective forms of skilled action, such as seeking the right word
(Klaassen et al., 2010), evaluating the quality of an architectural design (Rietveld
and Brouwers, 2016) or making a correct explicit judgment about something
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015).
2The interdependence is also highlighted in the way Gibson (1979) conceives of
the relation between an ecological niche, i.e., a “set of affordances” (Gibson, 1979,
p. 128) that implies a way of life, and a kind of animal: “The natural environment
offers many ways of life, and different animals have different ways of life. The
niche implies a kind of animal, and the animal implies a kind of niche. Note the
complementarity of the two.” (Gibson, 1979, p. 128).
practices are maintained by responsiveness to the possibilities for
driving nails into walls.
The relation between parts and whole, we encounter here
in the form of activities and practices respectively, can also
be understood in constitutive terms. Consider for example
the activities and the individuals partaking in a practice –
for example the medical practice we saw in the ethnographic
example above. As the situation in the doctor’s office unfolds,
some person is primarily a “patient,” papers become important
“letters,” reciprocally, in doing so, in acting, the behavior setting
at the doctor’s office is maintained: thus when someone walks
in unexpectedly for example, he will immediately adjust his
behavior to fit in with the reserved atmosphere. The medical
practices are thus maintained by the activities of the individuals
within it. What the constitutive reading stresses is that the
whole (the practices) gives form to its parts (the activities
unfolding within it) and these activities equally give form
to the practices as a whole. In general, in a constitutive
entanglement the parts are continuous characteristics of a
process – this process then is the continuously forming whole3
(see Barker, 1968; Shotter, 1983; Ingold, 2000, 2011; Van Dijk,
2016).
What this constitutive entanglement highlights, and
ethnographic research helps to make tangible, is that we can
take multiple complementary perspectives on the constellation
of practices and that we can foreground the sociomateriality in
each. First, the fact that in this view practices and affordances
are two sides of the same coin, i.e., of the same sociomaterial
entanglement of people, activities, places and things, allows us
to switch between foregrounding the one or the other. Second,
the idea that (individual or joint) activities are constitutionally
related to (communal) practices allows us to conceptualize their
differences as one of degree rather than kind. As researchers,
we can thus think of ourselves as zooming in and out in both
space and time on a form of life, to bring different aspects of
it into prominence: practices or activities, affordances or their
sociomateriality.
To unpack this view further and to bring its implications
to bear on the relation between social coordination and
affordances in ecological psychology, we will now introduce
the Skilled Intentionality Framework that has sociomateriality
at its heart. Through the SIF we will show how we can take
(i) the zoomed out perspective on (relatively) persistent
sociomateriality of a whole form of life (see The Zoomed
Out Perspective: Practices and Affordances), (ii) a zoomed
in perspective of a local observer looking at sociomateriality
in flux (see Zooming in on the Landscape of Affordances)
and (iii) the perspective from within an unfolding action
as an individual responds to the multiple affordances
available to him or her (see The Unfolding Action from
the Actor’s Lived Perspective). Bringing these perspectives
together, we will show in Section “Skilled Intentionality
Unfolding in Architectural Practice” how they integrate
social coordination and affordances such that ecological
3Note that in this view, as a process the whole is itself never complete. It is
fundamentally open to change.
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psychology will be open to account for real life situations of
dealing with non-existent things, such as modeling a future
building.
PRACTICES AND THE LANDSCAPE OF
AFFORDANCES
Wittgenstein’s concept of the ‘form of life’ fits in nicely with the
constitutional entanglement and the constellation of practices
as we identified them in ethnography and Costall’s work. The
form of life of a kind of animal, as Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014, p. 328) point out, “consists of patterns in its behavior, i.e.,
relatively stable and regular ways of doing things.” Such relatively
stable ways of doing things show themselves for example in the
regularities that characterizes expert practices like architecture,
surgery and academia as well as in our everyday activities, such as
our appropriate use of chairs or doors and the way we talk about
them (Wittgenstein, 1969, §7).
The constitutive character of the relation between activities
and the standing practices, i.e., the form of life, implies that
activities are sensible aspects only relative to the form of life.
An example of this would be our human form of life in
which we use, e.g., chairs for sitting and doors to enter or
close off a room. Chairs do not play a role in the forms
of life of, say, lions or earthworms, but they are relevant in
our form of life. Indeed, were we to show genuine surprise
or disbelief each time we encountered a chair, we would
act inappropriately in a strong sense: we would fail to make
sense because we fail to share with others a way of acting,
of responding to, everyday things – that is, we fail to share
agreement in our form of life, which is an agreement in what
people typically do (Wittgenstein, 1953, §123; see Ter Hark,
1990, p. 70; Schatzki, 2002). The meaning and relevance of
our activities are constrained by the form of life in which they
figure.
To Wittgenstein, through our concrete activities of talking
and doing (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004) both in everyday life and in
expertise, a river-bed of practices continuously shows itself. These
practices constrain activities – talking and doing – that unfold
within it (Rietveld, 2008a), just as the movements of the water
is constrained by the river-bed. Reciprocally, the movement also
allows for shifts in the river-bed itself:
“. . . I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the
river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp
division of the one from the other” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §97)
The Skilled Intentionality Framework (Rietveld, 2012;
Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014, Figure 1; Rietveld and Kiverstein,
2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld et al., 2016)
aligns with Wittgenstein and identifies the constellation of
sociomaterial practices we encountered above as our human
form of life. The form of life consists, in other words, of our
actively maintained standing practices – our regular ways of
doing things:
“What is common to human beings is not just the biology we
share but also our being embedded in sociocultural practices: our
sharing steady ways of living with others, our relatively stable ways
of going on.” (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 329)
By taking up the Wittgensteinian concept of the form of life,
the SIF opens up ecological psychology to sociomaterial aspects
of the world. It includes the constraining influence of material
properties but also our shared practical understanding of the
affordances offered by buildings, chairs, silence areas and other
people (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 329 ff.; see Kiverstein
and Rietveld, 2015, p. 15).
The Zoomed Out Perspective: Practices
and Affordances
Notice that the form of life, as relatively stable and regular
patterns of behavior, is perfectly concrete. We can see this clearly
when we as behavioral scientists or philosophers “zoom out”
from an individual’s activity in a sociomaterial situation to a
perspective that allows us to discern patterns in the behavior of
a community of people of a larger spatiotemporal grain. Think,
for example, of the regularities one would notice when watching
a time-lapse recording from above on New York’s Paley park
or Amsterdam’s Vondelpark (see Whyte, 1980; Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014). Regular ways of doing things appear across,
e.g., seasons or times of day, and depend on, for example, the
sociomaterial aspects of the environment such as benches, ponds
and paths. For example, we will see people walk on paths and to
a lesser extent on grass, but not on ponds, except when the water
of the ponds is frozen.
We will call this view that aims to overlook such regularities
of the form of life from a time-lapse camera a “zoomed out”
perspective. Zooming in we see individuals caught up with people
and things in multiple ongoing activities, but zooming out we
notice their regularities: persistent practices – that is to say, the
stable patterns of behaving that characterize the form of life. By
calling attention to the form of life, the SIF aims to make the
regularities that our activities exhibit tangible, and show how
these regularities are sociomaterial and therefore aspects of the
environment that are available for coordinating with.
Now in order to have a notion of affordances that
acknowledges these large scale regularities and that is therefore
open to sociomaterial practice, affordances are defined within
the SIF as related to the form of life: an affordance is a relation
between an aspect of the sociomaterial environment in flux and
an ability available in a form of life (Rietveld and Kiverstein,
2014, p. 335; see also cf. Chemero, 2009; Rietveld, 2016; Rietveld
and Brouwers, 2016). From this definition it is clear that this
conception of affordances aims to emphasize the entanglement
of the ever changing sociomaterial environment and the abilities
that continuously form within this environment. Note that the
definition does not imply a prior separation of its relata.
Defining affordances relative to a form of life turns the
materiality of affordances into sociomateriality in the human
case. It allows us to make sense of a chair not just as a place to sit
but, as we shall see, as a chair as it figures in its many ways in our
human practices, inviting sitting, but also naming, pointing to or
marveling at in a museum (Withagen et al., 2012; Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014). Similarly, doors are not only hinging vertical
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surfaces, but are doors that can solicit opening or keeping closed.
And, as we shall see, it allows us to understand how stones can
afford throwing in one situation and afford being a paper weight
in the next. All these affordances are situated, but concretely
available aspects of the sociomaterial environment to coordinate
to. We can see that they function in these manifold ways if we
zoom out on our practices in space and time to notice how chairs,
doors, benches, paths and ponds are entangled within and across
concrete situations.
Skilled Intentionality Frameworks sociomaterial notion of
affordances is a more inclusive notion of affordances than the
traditional purely “material” one. Nonetheless, these affordances
still pose enormous (material and social) constrains on the
possibilities available to an individual, to the extent that their
materiality can appear to be “subject to no alteration or only to
an imperceptible one” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §99). Thus although
an office chair not only allows sitting, but now also affords for
example calling it “an office chair,” the material reality of this
aspect of the sociomaterial environment still does not allow us
to fly to Baghdad on it (cf. Cutting, 1982). So the SIF’s notion of
affordances is constrained by material reality. As we will explain
below and in the next section, however, the situated nature of
encountering a chair as sociomaterial allows us to also make sense
of the fact that a skilled individual will typically be constrained
even further – he or she will for example not be inclined to point
and call out “an office chair!” save when surprised to find one,
as for example in a museum (compare this to a young child). In
short, the SIF considers our human actions to be constrained by
(and responsive to) not just the environment’s materiality, but its
(broader and irreducible) sociomateriality.
Zooming in on the Landscape of
Affordances
Having defined affordances relationally and in terms of the
form of life, an important re-orientation realized by the Skilled
Intentionality Framework is that it allows us to switch between
the standing practices and the affordances that they imply.
Given that in our human form of life there are many aspects
of the sociomaterial environment and many abilities available,
these standing practices can thus be seen as unfolding in a
relatively persisting rich “landscape of affordances” (Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014).
By calling attention to the landscape of affordances within a
form of life, the SIF allows us not only to understand the practices
from the perspective of the affordances that they imply (in the
park, for example, including the action possibilities offered by
benches, paths and ponds), but it also allows us to zoom in
on concrete and situated activities that constitute the various
grains of the form of life (see Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Specifically, we can zoom in to the spatiotemporal grain where
individuals live (e.g., sitting on benches but not swimming on
benches) – that is, the zoomed in perspective of the local observer.
This is the perspective where, e.g., the dynamics of a behavior
setting, a place or another concrete situation unfold as observed
from the perspective of a behavioral scientist or as modeled by
coordination dynamics.
Notice, however, that this zoomed in perspective, while
highlighting the unfolding dynamics, obscures large-scale
regularities. Just as one cannot observe someone’s habits if one
just observe the person for a few seconds, one cannot observe a
practice by watching it briefly. From the zoomed in perspective
we are standing too close to see the regularity of the engagement
with affordances as it occurs in an entire sociomaterial practice
(say the practice of architecture). Yet we do see another aspect
of this landscape: we see how the details of the sociomaterial
environment are changing and affordances are forming in the
sociomaterial entanglement of people coordinating with others
and materials in real-time. To make this concrete, let us turn to
an example of sociomaterial coordination in action.
Sociomaterial Constitution in Practice
As an example of the sociomateriality of the landscape of
affordances in flux, consider a situation in which one is having
a coffee with a friend at a coffee bar. Coffee bars have become
part of our human form of life; it is a behavior setting where
the “recurrent features” of the coffee bar “both become[. . .]
a resource for, and [are] organized by, customers speaking
together” in coffee bars (Laurier, 2008, p. 168). Zooming in to
the scale of the skilled individual entering into such a place for a
drink, the way the room is furnished, the walls, the tables, the bar,
the chairs, the people, turn out to entangle into a rich landscape
of affordances in flux that enable and constrain the activities of an
individual entering into the behavior setting: the welcoming smile
of the waiter offers the affordance of ordering coffee, the friend
affords having a conversation, the coffee cup affords grasping,
the spoon stirring, the coffee drinking, the biscuit eating and the
people to the right afford glancing at. Moreover, somewhere on
the horizon of this situation, the 4PM train the person is planning
to take back home will afford catching.
Looking at the sociomateriality in flux, we can see how social
coordination and materiality are intermingling as affordances
show up. As different affordances are coordinated with and
responded to in appropriate ways, they change the sociomaterial
environment – and thus the landscape of affordances shaping the
unfolding situation. For example, during the conversation, the
affordances of the words spoken by the friend and the affording
coffee are coordinated with and get intertwined: “[T]he very fact
of drinking . . . eases the conversation along. . . . Alongside this
. . . the movements and objects that accompany drinking become
resources in talking together” (Laurier, 2008, p. 178).
Consider how, at a later moment in the ethnographic
transcript, a detail like placing a cup (in this case a glass) helps
to shape the affordance to leave the coffee bar:
“After this quick sip F makes a charming and classic gesture of
having finished with her drink even though the glass is not empty
when she puts it back on the table: she pushes it away from her.
The glass ending up slightly beyond the can of coke, a visible
adjustment to the previous repeated return point of the glass to the
table. By her pushing it away, she is establishing it, at this point in
the unfolding action, as potentially the last sip from the glass.... F
displays in this gesture, that she has noticed that B has finished her
coffee and is now making available to B that they are potentially
both finished with their drinks.” (Laurier, 2008, p. 175)
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By gesturing (“social”) with the glass (“material”) and
simultaneously changing the layout of the table (“material”)
in subtle ways, a small part of the sociomaterial environment
as a whole is reconfigured.4 Doing so, the local landscape of
affordances changes for both people situated in it and the
affordance to leave can become one shared relevant possibility
among others.
Notice that from this perspective on a complex yet everyday
situation in flux, as from the perspective on the form of life from
afar, again everything is social and everything is material to some
degree. Situated here in the landscape, the coffee spoon, the cup,
the chairs, intermingle to become “resources in talking together”
(Laurier, 2008, p. 178). Their materiality constrains the situation
and helps to form a temporary “social synergy” (Marsh, 2015)
that engages and constrains the behavior of both persons: “The
unit they have formed will be resistant to forces that temporarily
perturb the action” (Marsh, 2015, p. 23). Even the affordance to
stand up and leave, which is coordinated to in the coffee bar
situation by the two skilled talkers, is sociomaterial: both the
flow of the conversation, the gesture and the change in table
configuration enabled it. One would not manifest much skill in
conversing if one were to stand up and leave the conversation
halfway an unfinished sentence. The relevance of the possibility
to stand up in this particular situation here and now, is neither
just related to an embodied ability, nor is it just material or
social – it is related to the constitutive entanglement of ability and
sociomateriality.
Persistence through Change
This sociomateriality of affordances can be further highlighted
when we imagine it is getting late and the 4PM train that one
of the friends in the coffee bar needs to catch will leave very
soon – she is in a hurry. When in a hurry, this concern of
the individual will extend her situation, which means that it
includes coordinating to a larger part of the landscape in which
the individual is situated. Including the distant departure of
the 4PM train within the situation will moreover re-configure
many other sociomaterial aspects. For example, the frequency
of the sips of coffee by the rushed person will increase and the
topic discussed in conversation may be constrained. A moment
of harmonious silence can now be the kind of opening in the
conversation that moves the person to a slap on the thigh and
the remark that it is time to leave (see Laurier, 2008). Although
much in the behavior setting remains the same, in the newly
unfolding sociomaterial context many affordances also change –
even the temperature at which the coffee will afford drinking
will be higher. In short, parts of the sociomaterial environment
and the resulting behavior patterns are continuously re-arranged
and reconfigured and other affordances enter the situation and
dissipate as the departure time of the train approaches or the
coffee is finished.5
4Note that a closer examination of the gesturing, glass and table layout would reveal
that all three are sociomaterial themselves rather than either social or material.
5What this approach does is taking seriously the flux of the sociomaterial
environment (see Ingold, 2000, 2011 for the importance of this). This is crucial for
dealing with many real-life situation. Think for instance of situations of crossing a
From the perspective of a local observer that we adopted
when zooming in on persisting practice in our form of life, we
can thus see individuals in the process of coordinating skillfully.
Any particular action within this process will be constrained by
the available possibilities for acting in the form of life that we
zoomed in on, and that the individuals that we see grew up in.
As a particular action is unfolding, the particular sociomateriality
of the local landscape of affordances will constrain the available
actions further still – my pen with red ink will not afford drawing
a blue line (see Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 344) even though
drawing blue lines is certainly a possibility available in our form
of life.
Nonetheless, there is an important amount of uncertainty
for the local observer, because the observed action can always
continue in several directions – it has a kind of indeterminacy
(Shotter, 1983; Schatzki, 2012, pp. 19–20) in the sense that what
is done is yet to be determined – and can only be determined
by the observer after the observed activity has been performed.
In other words, namely viewed in terms of affordances: from
the perspective of a local observer someone else’s particular
unfolding action at a particular location in the landscape implies
a multitude of possibilities which decrease in number as his or
her action unfolds further until only one is realized (even though
the situation will continue to afford many more actions).
To give an example of this increasing determinacy of action,
consider that increasing the frequency of the sips of coffee allows
not just for getting the 4PM train, but also for entirely different
affordances such as making it to the bakery before it closes and
for catching the 4PM movie. These possibilities are all available in
the landscape of affordances in which the individual is situated.
By continuously being responsive to (and constrained by) the
relevant affordances available in the landscape however, the
person turns left toward the station rather than right toward the
bakery for example, and the possibility to go to the bakery moves
further out of the individual’s situation (and other possibilities
move in). All the while moreover the possibility to catch the
4PM train not only persists but also gains determinacy: the
coordinated activity that started with increasing the frequency
of sips at the coffee bar, ends in allowing little more than
catching the 4PM train by jumping through the aperture of the
closing doors of the train at the platform. At that point, the
coordinated activity has realized the affordance to catch the 4PM
train through coordinating sociomaterial aspects in a particular
way, as was seen by the local observer, while of course many new
possibilities for action have already entered the situation in which
the individual is located.
Zooming in on the nested actions within the catching of the
train, we see the same increasing determinacy of the coordinated
activity even clearer. Again the space of possibilities available
while acting will be constrained by the form of life, including the
nesting affordance of catching the 4PM train and the behavior
setting that the individual is a part of. The local observer might
see for example that the person in the coffee bar is slightly moving
forward toward the table. Limited by the narrow scope of the
busy street by foot. The affordances for crossing the street open up and dissipate
(discontinuously) all the time.
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perspective of the local observer, it is uncertain what will happen
next. Moving toward the table brings many affordances “within
reach”: the possibility to stand up, to knock on the table, to
indicate to a friend that it is time to leave, or to grasp the coffee
cup. The action possibilities available in the local landscape are
many. Again however, a person that lets herself be moved by
the demands of the whole situation (including the 4PM train)
responds in a way that the affordances attainable will, from the
perspective of a local observer, decrease in number as her action
unfolds until she in fact reaches and grasps the cup of coffee
that she goes on to finish quickly. The indeterminacy of each act
is continuously reduced during its unfolding until the relevant
affordances are enacted in a certain unfolding sequence which
reconfigures the particular sociomaterial entanglement.
What this zoomed in perspective shows is that the
sociomateriality of the landscape of affordances that appears
relatively persistent from a zoomed out perspective is in flux
from the perspective of a local observer. When an individual
acts he or she entangles sociomateriality and contributes to
the regular ways of doing things available in the form of life.
Which regularity of all the available regularities in the form of
life the unfolding activity strengthens, however, is determined
by what the individual does; in the unfolding sequence of the
individual’s concrete activities. As the 4PM train is caught for
example, it adds to our standing practice of catching trains,
but not to that of going to the movie or to the bakery. In
doing so, the skillful responsiveness of an individual’s situated
activities contributed a tiny bit to keeping the affordance of
taking trains available in our form of life – the individual
enacted the affordance of catching trains (cf. Shotter, 1983). The
landscape of affordances that is seen as persisting from a zoomed
out perspective, turns out to be maintained, from the zoomed
in observer’s perspective, by the multitude of ways in which
ongoing coordination is entangled in sociomaterial situations in
flux.
SKILLED INTENTIONALITY
In order to integrate social coordination and affordances
into a common framework, the foregoing discussion of
the SIF showed how social coordination and materiality
are situated and entangled in the affordances available in
the form of life, which we can see from a zoomed out
perspective (the first perspective discussed). We moreover
showed what such continuous intermingling looks like in
terms of the ongoing coordination we find from a zoomed
in (local observer’s) perspective on real-life situations (second
perspective). However, we also aim to show how responding
to affordances is always unfolding in concrete situations and
how accounting for this in an integrative framework could
extend the scope of ecological psychology. To show this we
need to provide a third perspective on the form of life:
we need the actor’s lived perspective which foregrounds the
responsiveness to multiple relevant affordances of an individual
that developed his or her skills within the form of life we are
considering.
Acting within a Field of Relevant
Affordances
As mentioned above, Skilled Intentionality is defined as
coordinating with multiple affordances simultaneously in a
concrete situation (Rietveld et al., 2016). Individuals are
enmeshed in a constellation of practices; in a form of life. In the
SIF, acting individuals can be thought of as continuously forming
aspects of the sociomaterial environment and thus as part of the
landscape of affordances.
Skilled individuals are already entangled within the landscape
of affordances (i.e., their partaking is implied by the “abilities”
part of the definition of affordances as relations between aspects
of the sociomaterial environment in flux and abilities available in
a form of life). They can have access to a part of the landscape in
so far as they have the skills to act on it (Noë, 2012).6 A skilled
individual engages with, and continuously develops within a part
of the landscape he or she cares about, which is lived as the “field
of relevant affordances.”
The field of relevant affordances consists of the affordances
that are currently significant to a skilled individual as he or
she is engaging with a concrete situation. As mentioned above,
it refers to the lived perspective, opened by the individual’s
abilities and concerns, on a part of the landscape of affordances
in flux. Experientially the field of affordances is made up by
the relevant affordances that “stand out” among the rest of the
landscape of affordances (De Haan et al., 2013; Bruineberg and
Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein, 2016). These attractive affordances
are described as soliciting, or inviting, behavior (Dreyfus and
Kelly, 2007; Withagen et al., 2012; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
The soliciting character of these relevant affordances is the
experiential equivalent of a bodily “action readiness” on the part
of the skilled individual (Frijda, 1986, 2007). This preparation
to act on relevant affordances is possible because of the abilities
the individual has acquired thanks to a history of interactions in
sociomaterial practices (Rietveld, 2008a).
These relevant affordance-related states of action readiness are
crucial for understanding the interdependence of the skilled
individual and his or her evolving situation as can be observed
by a local observer or scientist (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014).
Briefly, according to the SIF, a skilled individual has developed
her abilities within the dynamics of the landscape of affordances
of a form of life. The individual’s intrinsic dynamics can be
understood as multiple bodily states of action readiness that
are attuned to the relevant affordances in the situation. States
of action readiness are reciprocally coupled to the landscape of
affordances, in the sense that these states of action readiness
self-organize and shape the selective openness to the landscape
of affordances for the individual to accommodate the skilled
individual’s concerns, i.e., to allow him or her to maintain
or obtain sufficient grip on the situation. In this way, some
affordances in the landscape show up as more and some as
less relevant to the individual’s unfolding activities. The intrinsic
6Note that certain types of power and exclusion in society can make it the case
that someone with the right skills still does not succeed in getting access to an
affordance. A discussion of this political dimension of affordances in the context
of the SIF will have to wait to another occasion.
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dynamics of the individual’s states of action readiness thus
allows for a selective openness to be responsive to the relevant
affordances the individual encounters as it acts (for more on
this see De Haan et al., 2013; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014;
Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Bruineberg et al., 2016).
The Unfolding Action from the Actor’s
Lived Perspective
The field of affordances brings us a final and crucial viewpoint on
the form of life: it complements the first zoomed out, overlooking,
perspective and the second zoomed in perspective of the local
observer of someone’s activities with a re-orientation on the latter
perspective, now from within the actions as they unfold. That
is, thirdly, it adds to our perspectives on the form of life the
means to understand the actor’s lived perspective – his or her first
person experience. Viewed from within, the evolving landscape
of affordances appears both as soliciting and as persisting. That
is, while we lose track of some of the flux of patterned human
activity over time, we gain a sense of skilled intentionality and a
renewed view on the persistence of affordances.
Recall how the relative persistence of regularities in standing
practices made way for continuous change of the sociomaterial
environment as we zoomed in on the landscape of affordance.
Now that we re-orient our perspective toward the actor’s lived
perspective, these two phenomena – the persistence of the form
of life that an individual grows up in, and the continuous change
in the sociomaterial environment that acting implies – can be
reconnected. To see how this would work we need to consider
the continuity in the history of the skilled individual who acts.
From the lived perspective we experience the landscape of
affordances in flux from within, on the basis of the continuity
of our own history of skills as we have been growing up within
our form of life (that we can see from a zoomed out perspective).
In other words, our individual familiarity with our form of life
is based on our history of skilled engagement7 (see also Heft,
1996; Rietveld, 2008a; Myin, 2016; Van Dijk and Withagen, 2016).
From the lived perspective, the landscape of affordances in flux
(that we could identify from a zoomed in observer’s perspective)
shows up in terms of a multitude of possibilities for acting that are
relevant to someone’s life and current concerns and solicit him
or her to act on them. When acting to catch the 4PM train, the
individual’s particular history within the form of life enables the
person to be selectively responsive to those relevant affordances
that move him/her toward the train station. In spite of the flux of
the situation in which the skilled individual is engaged the person
selectively responds to the affordances relevant to him/her.
With the actor’s lived perspective on the landscape of
affordances in flux we thus connect with both the zoomed
out perspective on the form of life and with the zoomed in
perspective of the local observer. Notice that, as we have seen
above, by selectively responding to the soliciting affordances in
the individual’s field of relevant affordances, the skilled individual
7Below we will see that abilities are acquired in concrete situations in sociomaterial
practice. This process of enskilment is typically scaffolded by more experienced
practitioners in a process that can be characterized as education of attention (see
Rietveld, 2008a; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
is in the process of contributing to the maintenance of these
affordances as available in the form of life as a whole. Thus,
the increasing determinacy of the act that we saw from the
zoomed in perspective on the landscape of affordances, can
return in the lived perspective. Here, however, it has a different
character: we propose that a skilled individual can experience
the increasing determinacy of action from within the unfolding
act as “directedness” toward the relevant affordances available
in the form of life that she is in the process of enacting.
This unfolding enactment can be experienced pre-reflectively as
having an “intentional” character (see cf. Shotter, 1983; Heft,
1989). Unlike the local observer, the acting individual herself
will relatively seldom be uncertain about or surprised by the
things that she does during the day, because action switches
are often already announced by the pre-reflectively experienced
attraction/allure of some of the relevant affordances in the field.
Considering the skillful responsiveness to multiple nesting and
nested affordances simultaneously, i.e., the responsiveness to a
whole field of relevant affordances, an individual then manifests
skilled intentionality in the context of his or her form of life (see
Rietveld, 2008b; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014).
Skilled Intentionality Unfolding in
Architectural Practice
Finally, to show the merit of having these three complementary
perspectives at our disposal within the Skilled Intentionality
Framework, we turn to a case of skilled individuals who have
learned to respond skillfully to the sociomaterial practices they
are part of: we turn to architects working on a future building
(a mobile sculpture). In doing so we aim to show how the
sociomateriality of affordances can open up ecological theory
to enable it to deal with what traditionally are considered
“hard cases” such as dealing with non-existent things. Against
the background of this example, in the discussion that follows
we return to our starting point and consider the relation
between social coordination and engagement with affordances by
discussing how the SIF incorporates each and how it invites us to
take a more situated approach in each case.
The nice thing about conceptualizing affordances as belonging
to a form of life – i.e., in a fundamentally sociomaterial way –
is that it can allow ecological psychology to move beyond the
concrete-abstract distinction that is omnipresent in cognitive
science. Consider a case where architects are designing a large
mobile sculpture (taken from Rietveld and Brouwers, 2016).
This sculpture, which is the size of a small house, is heavy and
constructively requires such a large rear wheel that it might
compromise the esthetics of the work of art. The architects start
to determine how to proceed, using several affordances offered by
the sociomaterial environment and creating some new ones:
“[Junior project leader AM] clicks on her computer, moving
and changing lines, perspectives, colors, and scales; she makes
adjustments and new sketches to then again revise these by
adjusting lines and so on. . . . [S]he prints the five designs [and]
walks over to [architect] RR, puts the printed drawings in front
of him on the table when, while keeping their eyes focused on the
prints, they pull up their chairs and stoop over the five designs. . . .
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RR picks up a pen, ticks off the second design, and then strikes
it through: ‘This isn’t good.’ He then checks the fifth design:
‘Can the wheel rotate/turn around here?’ And what about the
side-view/profile, what does it look like here?’ AM responds in
a somewhat doubtful way, after which RR also strikes out this
design. ‘Look, the wheel does not nicely connect here, in the other
alternatives you have created more space at this point.”’ (Rietveld
and Brouwers, 2016, p. 9)
Notice the many affordances that solicit and are acted on in
a coordinated fashion: lines of the computer solicit changing,
chairs afford pulling up and sitting next to each other, the pen
solicits picking up and writing, a question affords answering, and
the printed drawings solicit several comparisons. Coordinating
with these nested affordances, just as in the 4PM train-example,
entangles sociomaterial aspects as it enacts the nesting affordance
of developing a good design.
Recall how the activity of catching the 4PM train was
increasingly determined, and the affordance of taking trains
enacted, in simultaneously coordinating to the standing practices
in which trains run on time, the possibility of getting to the
train station, of drinking coffee, and of paying the bill. Similarly
here, in the process of realizing a satisfying design for the mobile
sculpture, the design is increasingly determined by acting in
accordance with the practices where the final design will have
its place (e.g., as a mobile sculpture for public use and as part
of an art collection) and simultaneously coordinating to the
affordances offered by the printed drawings, the movable 3D-
lines, the pen and a collaborator (Rietveld and Brouwers, 2016).
The right design therefore does not need to be “determined”
in advance. There is no fully specified picture or description
of the end result on the basis of which the design is realized.
On the contrary, the design is realized in practice because it is
getting increasingly determined or developed in acting within the
landscape of affordances. The process of designing the sculpture
can even have the determining, directed, character of nesting
affordance for the architects, because they are in the process of
enacting a satisfying design. For example, having the five different
printed drawings affords a more precise conversation, within
which they are evaluated one by one, compared and discarded in
the process until finally one, it turns out, is selected for further
development, which improves the architects’ grip on the final
design and resolves a feeling of dissatisfaction or discontent (see
Rietveld and Brouwers, 2016).
This kind of skilled intentionality is founded on a history
of engaging in the relevant practices in which many details of
the sociomaterial environment have been encountered (Rietveld,
2008a; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Myin, 2016). Having
the ability to act in accordance with both the point and the
details of the sociomaterial practice is having skill – in this
case an architect’s skill. In the process of coordinating with an
evolving field of relevant affordances offered by the sociomaterial
environment, the architects tend toward grip on their design.
Thus, although during this episode the mobile sculpture was still
non-existent in a sense, it is perfectly concrete as the coordination
with sociomaterial aspects of the environment is realizing the
affordance of designing a mobile sculpture.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By making the human form of life the starting point for ecological
psychology, and thus foregrounding sociomateriality in each
situation, this paper showed how the Skilled Intentionality
Framework integrates affordances with social coordination. In
the SIF affordances are defined as relations between aspects of
the sociomaterial environment in flux and abilities available in
a form of life. By showing how the sociomaterial entanglement
re-appears when taking three different perspectives on (i) the
whole form of life – and the persistent landscape of affordances
it implies, and (ii) the zoomed in perspective of an observing
behavioral scientist or dynamicist observing an actor located at
a particular place in the landscape of affordances and (iii) the
lived perspective of person engaged in action – we showed what a
situated, integrated take on engagement with affordances looks
like. Thus we showed how different aspects of the notion of
affordances and of coordination fit in: while theories and methods
of (social) coordination tend to focus on the zoomed in observer’s
perspective on the (inter)actions within an evolving landscape
of affordances, those studying affordance perception are mostly
focusing on affordances as we encounter them from our lived
perspective – as agent-scaled perceived resources for action (e.g.,
Warren, 1984; Oudejans et al., 1996).
However, as we have stressed throughout this paper, these
different viewpoints offer complementary (and not necessarily
exhaustive) perspectives on the sociomaterial entanglement of
the form of life as a whole (see Klaassen et al., 2010). The
perspectives suggest that both fields of ecological psychology
could consider broadening their scope in two principled ways.
First, they could broaden the range of phenomena within their
own perspective. As we have detailed, one is never coordinating
with other people in isolation. The sociomateriality of the
landscape of affordances in flux urges the study of social
coordination to include coordination with materiality, i.e., as
sociomaterial synergies. Moreover, zooming out emphasizes a
focus not just at the scale of immediate interpersonal (e.g., dyadic)
interaction, but to also include nesting scales of coordinating
(Wijnants et al., 2012; Schmidt et al., 2014) with more distant
dealings and places (Heft, 1996; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014;
Van Dijk and Withagen, 2016) and perhaps even entire practices
(Rietveld and Brouwers, 2016) and language games (Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014; Van Dijk, 2016). Furthermore, from a lived
perspective, one never encounters an affordance in isolation.
Studies on affordances should thus take note of the sociomaterial
context by studying affordance perception in the context of a
field of relevant affordances embedded in a behavior setting
(Heft, 2007, 2012) and/or a sociomaterial practice (Rietveld and
Brouwers, 2016; Rietveld et al., 2016). By taking a more situated
approach, both fields can thus contribute to the same overall goal
of extending the reach of ecological psychology toward dealing
with case of so-called “higher” cognition.
Second, as each of the three perspectives discussed
foregrounds different aspects of the form of life, but backgrounds
or neglects others, we believe each field should aim to keep an
eye on at least one other perspective on the form of life to be
able to claim to see the whole picture. Ethnography highlights
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the importance of this as it aims to link a zoomed in perspective
on concrete situations, or interviews based on individual’s lived
perspective, to the regularities at the level of the sociomaterial
practice as a whole; i.e., to what we have called a zoomed out
view on the form of life. Ecological psychology could thus benefit
from including ethnographical methods and social sciences
that thematize the patterned practice of the form of life (e.g.,
Roepstorff, 2008). That way we can get a clear view of the richness
of the landscape of available affordances offered by our evolving
sociomaterial environment (e.g., Malafouris, 2014) as it persists
and changes within cultures, communities, and behavior settings.
The view that we have presented in its multitude of
perspectives on the whole does not need to rely on (ontological)
priorities, in the sense that it does not need to presuppose
a hierarchical and pre-structured world (see Van Dijk and
Withagen, 2014; Van Dijk, 2016; see also Hodges and Baron, 1992;
Ingold, 2011). For example, the notion of “higher” cognition
that we discussed is indicative of a supposed hierarchy, but
its use can be avoided once we realize that the phenomenon
the notion aims to single out (e.g., architects designing a
novel sculpture) amounts to adequately coordinating with
multiple affordances simultaneously across increasing scales
of sociomateriality. Conceptually this required the notion
of a constitutive entanglement. One of the merits of our
view on the constitutive entanglement is that it ties our
concepts in with a process that constitutes the whole while
forming its parts. In this way it opens up our theory to the
scrutiny of dynamical methods, in which it is common to
distinguish between macro-level patterns of activity and micro-
level patterns of activity. For example, we can formalize the
dynamics of the agent-environment system as a whole, or
focus on a part and use the tools and concepts of dynamical
systems theory to increase our understanding of the dynamics
of multiple simultaneous affordance-related states of action
readiness (see Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Bruineberg et al.,
2016).
Finally, in a fragment quoted by Costall (1997), Gibson tried
to clarify how affordances are objective and subjective through
their relational persistence: “Affordances are both objective and
persisting and, at the same time, subjective, because they relate
to the species or individual for whom something is afforded”
(Gibson, 1982, p. 237). Our view makes sense of this idea by
showing how the distinction between the individual and the
“species” is not the most relevant one. By rather talking about
a form of life by focusing more on “how an animal lives than
[on] where it lives” (Gibson, 1979, p. 128), i.e., on its way of life,
we showed that affordances are both persisting environmental
resources which can solicit an individual and persisting relations
in the ecological niche. Yet they are continuously forming in the
multitude of our activities that make up our form of life.
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